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OH, WON’T YOU STAY WITH ME?:
DETERMINING WHETHER § 3 OF THE FAA
REQUIRES A STAY IN LIGHT OF
KATZ V. CELLCO PARTNERSHIP
Alessandra Rose Johnson*
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides the legal framework to
render international and interstate arbitration agreements judicially
enforceable in the United States. In furtherance of that goal, it provides
that, if a party initiates litigation rather than arbitration of an arbitrable
dispute, either party may request that the court stay the litigation pending
resolution in an arbitration proceeding. The U.S. courts of appeals are
currently split as to whether § 3 of the FAA requires a court under these
circumstances to stay the action or whether the court has the discretion to
dismiss the action altogether.
In Katz v. Cellco Partnership, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit—a leading U.S. court in creating and shaping domestic and
international arbitration law—recently sided with the majority of other
circuits in holding that § 3 requires a court to stay the litigation pending
arbitration. This Note supports the Second Circuit’s decision, argues that
the proper interpretation of FAA § 3 requires a stay, and proposes that the
Supreme Court adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning. Further, this Note
argues that the Second Circuit’s “mandatory-stay” approach is consistent
with the plain meaning of the statute and important policy objectives:
(1) providing the pro-arbitration framework Congress intended when
passing the FAA, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored;
(2) foreclosing interlocutory appeals of dismissals that stall arbitrations;
(3) rejecting docket management as a grounds for dismissal; and
(4) avoiding the general uncertainty and unpredictability of dismissals.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2262
I. THEN AND NOW: ARBITRATION AND THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
FAA, THE CLEAR TREND TOWARD PRO-ARBITRATION
PRINCIPLES, AND WHY THIS ISSUE MATTERS ............................. 2264
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.M. Classical Piano
Performance, Manhattan School of Music. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor
Thomas H. Lee, whose thoughtful advice, immeasurable expertise, and tremendous guidance
have made this work possible. I would also like to thank my mother for her unwavering
support, constant encouragement, and undying love throughout this process and always.

2261

2262

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

A. Overview of Arbitration .......................................................... 2264
B. Overview of the FAA ............................................................... 2265
C. The Significance of New York’s State and Federal Courts in
Arbitration Law..................................................................... 2266
D. Litigation or Arbitration?: The Separability Doctrine and
How This Issue Can Arise in Court ...................................... 2267
E. The Effect of a Court’s Order to Stay or Dismiss:
Interlocutory Appeals and Why This Issue Matters .............. 2269
F. The Supreme Court’s Cases Involving Arbitrable Claims ...... 2271
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: MANDATE A STAY OR PERMIT DISMISSAL? ..... 2271
A. Section 3 Mandates a Stay ...................................................... 2272
1. The Tenth Circuit ............................................................. 2272
2. The Eleventh Circuit ........................................................ 2273
3. The Seventh Circuit ......................................................... 2273
4. The Third Circuit ............................................................. 2274
5. The Second Circuit .......................................................... 2276
B. Section 3 Permits Dismissals .................................................. 2279
1. The Ninth Circuit ............................................................. 2279
2. The Fifth Circuit .............................................................. 2280
3. The First Circuit ............................................................... 2281
C. The Fourth Circuit Explicitly Remains Uncommitted ............ 2282
III. NO IFS, ANDS, OR BUTS: A DISTRICT COURT IS REQUIRED TO
GRANT A STAY UNDER § 3 ........................................................... 2283
A. A Textual Reading of § 3 Requires a Stay .............................. 2283
B. Policy Concerns Support Requiring a Stay ............................ 2284
1. Requiring a Stay Is More Consistent with ProArbitration Policy ............................................................ 2284
2. Requiring a Stay Avoids the Possibility of Interlocutory
Appeals............................................................................ 2285
3. Docket Management Is an Unpersuasive Justification
for Permitting Dismissals ................................................ 2286
4. Requiring a Stay Avoids the Chaos Currently
Surrounding Dismissals .................................................. 2286
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 2287
INTRODUCTION
This Note addresses confusion regarding the interpretation of § 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act1 (FAA or “the Act”). Currently, the U.S. courts of
1. Federal Arbitration Act , 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (“If any suit or proceeding be brought
in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being
satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
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appeals are split as to whether § 3 (1) requires a district court to stay an
action when all the issues are subject to arbitration or (2) grants a district
court the discretion to dismiss the action altogether. The First, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits have held that courts have the discretion to dismiss the
action. However, the Third, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and, most recently,
Second Circuits have held that a stay is mandated. This Note explores the
contrasting interpretations of § 3 and focuses on the implications of the
Second Circuit’s recent decision on the matter—Katz v. Cellco
Partnership.2 Further, this Note argues that the proper view of § 3 is to
require a stay, based on a number of justifications: the text, structure,
historical background, and policy of the statute; the Supreme Court’s clear
pro-arbitration position; and judicial economy and efficiency. Finally, this
Note argues that the significance of the Second Circuit’s recent decision
changes the legal landscape and warrants review of the issue by the
Supreme Court to resolve the split among the circuits.
Part I of this Note explores the nature of arbitration, including public
policy reasons for favoring it over litigation, and the history of the FAA—
highlighting how it was shaped and influenced by the New York Arbitration
Act of 1920, its purpose, and the provision in question.3 Part I also
discusses the significance of New York’s state and federal courts’ position
at the forefront of creating and interpreting arbitration law.4 Further, Part I
discusses how the issue of whether to stay or dismiss a dispute can arise in
court, implicating the separability doctrine, and the effects on the parties of
a court’s decision to stay or dismiss an action, focusing on interlocutory
appeals.5 Finally, it highlights the Supreme Court’s strong deference to the
arbitral process in recent case law. Part II discusses the circuit courts’
holdings, outlining their contrasting interpretations and analyzing the
Second Circuit’s opinion.6 Part III argues that district courts must grant a
stay when the action is pending arbitration because it is required by the text
of the statute, furthers well-established pro-arbitration policy, avoids the
undue delay and burden associated with interlocutory appeals, and avoids
the chaos associated with dismissals.7 Part III then argues that dismissals
cannot be justified by concerns of docket congestion, that they are a source
of chaos in the federal courts, and that the Second Circuit’s voice on this
issue warrants particular attention and deference.8 Finally, this Note
concludes that, because this issue has real, tangible consequences for
disputing parties and for the autonomy of the arbitral process, it is time for
the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split by adopting the Second

applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”). The FAA spans
9 U.S.C.
2. 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 596 (2015).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
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Circuit’s compelling framework.9 This Note ultimately argues that judicial
economy and efficiency, the goals and underlying policies of the FAA, and
the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration policies require courts to grant a stay
without the discretion to dismiss the action.10
I. THEN AND NOW: ARBITRATION AND THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE FAA,
THE CLEAR TREND TOWARD PRO-ARBITRATION PRINCIPLES,
AND WHY THIS ISSUE MATTERS
Section 3 of the FAA instructs a court to stay11 an action on application
of one of the parties if the court determines that the parties have agreed to
arbitrate a claim brought before it and that the issue is in fact arbitrable.12
The effect of a court’s decision to issue a stay is that no court proceedings
on matters subject to arbitration may occur until the arbitration is
complete.13 However, some circuit courts have read the FAA to grant a
district court the discretion to dismiss an action if all the issues are found to
be arbitrable.14 As the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue, a circuit
split remains.15 Before discussing the circuits’ conflicting views, this part
explores (1) the importance of arbitration, (2) the history and enactment of
the FAA, including its underlying principles and goals, (3) the significant
impact of New York law on arbitration law generally, (4) how arbitrable
disputes can land in court in the first place, (5) the effect of a court’s
decision to stay or dismiss the action, and (6) the increasingly proarbitration view of the Supreme Court.
A. Overview of Arbitration
Arbitration is a common form of alternative dispute resolution16 (ADR)
used to adjudicate or settle matters outside of a traditional court, typically
occurring as a result of a contractual agreement or court order.17 In
arbitration, the parties submit their disputes to one or more third-party
decision makers.18 Parties often favor arbitration over litigation because of
factors such as the expected speed of dispute resolution; the expertise of the
arbitrator; streamlined, cost-effective, and flexible procedures, including
limitations on discovery and pre-trial practice; confidentiality; and

9. See infra CONCLUSION.
10. See infra CONCLUSION.
11. A stay is “[a]n order to suspend all or part of a judicial proceeding or a judgment
resulting from that proceeding.” Stay, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
12. See Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 2000).
13. USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, Ltd., 574 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1978).
14. See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1998); Alford
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992); Sparling v. Hoffman
Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); see also infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Lloyd N. Shields, Arbitration As ADR, 41 LA. B.J. 222, 225 (1993).
17. See 83 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts §§ 10, 114 (2005).
18. See id. § 11.
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location.19 In accordance with public policy favoring arbitration, courts
construe the scope of arbitration agreements liberally.20
B. Overview of the FAA
Congress first enacted the FAA in 1925 and then reenacted and codified
it in 1947.21 The FAA governs arbitration agreements involving maritime
disputes and contracts involving interstate or foreign commerce.22 It was a
response to “the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts.”23 Its purpose was “to make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements
for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or
within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the subject of
litigation in the Federal courts.”24 In so doing, it “simply . . . make[s] the
contracting party live up to his agreement,” placing arbitration agreements
on the “same footing as other contracts.”25 The Supreme Court has
articulated the primary purpose behind the FAA—to “enforce agreements
into which parties had entered”—and noted that it effectively encourages
efficient dispute resolution.26
While the FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other contracts, it “does not require parties to arbitrate when
they have not agreed to do so.”27 Because the FAA “is at bottom a policy
19. See Shields, supra note 16, at 224–25. But see Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael
Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html (critiquing the arbitral process) [https://perma.cc/ALB2-MGD6]; Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/
arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (same) [https://perma.cc/YN79BMU3].
20. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985) (“[I]t is the congressional policy manifested in the [FAA] that requires courts
liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act . . . .”);
McMahan Sec. Co. v. Forum Capital Mkts. L.P., 35 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[W]e are
mindful that the ‘federal policy favoring arbitration requires us to construe arbitration
clauses as broadly as possible’ and that ‘arbitration should be ordered unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute.’” (quoting S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l,
Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194–95 (2d Cir. 1984))).
21. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
22. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
23. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
24. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
25. Id.; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (“[The FAA’s] purpose was . . . to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985).
26. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220–21 (citing 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)) (“It
creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in
commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.”).
27. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404
n.12 (1967) (“[T]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”).
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guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements,”28 courts
look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute—not to general
policy goals—to determine the scope of that agreement.29 For example,
ambiguities in the language of the agreement are resolved in favor of
arbitration,30 but not if the parties’ intent is clearly contrary or the result is
inconsistent with the plain text of the contract. Succinctly put, arbitration
under the FAA is “a matter of consent, not coercion.”31 The Supreme
Court’s articulation of the FAA’s aim in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd32 supports that fundamental principle, stating that the statute’s primary
purpose “requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if
the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation.”33
The FAA was modeled after the New York Arbitration Act of 192034
(NYAA), which was the first state or federal statute validating arbitration
agreements.35 Several other states later followed New York’s lead by
enacting their own arbitration statutes.36 One of the drafters of the FAA,
Julius Cohen, stated that “there can be little doubt that the attitude and the
decisions of the New York courts will be persuasive in the interpretation of
the Federal statute since the provisions of the two are largely identical.”37
In particular, the text of section 5 of the NYAA is strikingly similar to
that of § 3 of the FAA.38 Decisions interpreting the New York statute are
thus, at a minimum, instructive as to the meaning of its federal counterpart.
An early interpretation of the NYAA by the New York Court of Appeals at
the time of the FAA’s enactment required New York courts to stay matters
pending arbitration under section 5.39
C. The Significance of New York’s State and
Federal Courts in Arbitration Law
Rooted in the NYAA, modern federal arbitration law has been shaped by
New York courts.40 This remains true today. With the national trend of
growing arbitration, as well as ADR generally, the Second Circuit has been
a particularly influential player in this area of the law.41 The New York
28. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985).
29. See id. at 626.
30. See Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 475–76.
31. Id. at 479.
32. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
33. Id. at 221.
34. 1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 275.
35. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, ARBITRATION LAW 6 (2003) (“Modern arbitration law
has its origins in the New York Arbitration Act of 1920.”).
36. See id. at 10.
37. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 275 (1926).
38. Compare 1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 275, § 5, with 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
39. See generally Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921).
40. See supra Part I.B.
41. For examples of the Second Circuit’s pro-arbitration opinions generally, including in
contexts beyond the scope of this Note, see, for example, U.S. Fire Insurance v. National
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Convention, the foundational treaty for international arbitration, even bears
the state’s name, paying homage to the location that was so instrumental in
forming and enforcing the laws of arbitration.42 As a global center of
international business, securities trading, commerce, banking, and finance,
as well as a venue friendly to organized labor and collective bargaining,
New York is home to the lion’s share of international and domestic
arbitration.43 In fact, it is one of the most popular venues for international
arbitration in the world and the most popular city for domestic arbitration in
the country.44 Consequently, New York law is often chosen as the
governing law in business contracts, whether or not the parties or the
transactions in the dispute have any other connection to New York or the
United States.45 Thus, New York courts have developed a sophisticated
body of commercial law that supports the autonomy of the arbitral
process.46 Additionally, there is a wealth of expert ADR professionals in
New York, a solid reputation for neutral courts that have extensive
experience with complex commercial issues and other business disputes, a
strong policy in favor of arbitration, and the necessary infrastructure to
facilitate the management of any type of case.47
D. Litigation or Arbitration?:
The Separability Doctrine and How This Issue Can Arise in Court
Even where the litigants are parties to an arbitration agreement, their
dispute may find its way before a court.48 For example, a plaintiff can
Gypsum Co., 101 F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 1996), holding that the preclusive effect of a previous
ruling by a court on an arbitration is arbitrable just like any other defense to arbitration, and
Thomas James Association v. Jameson, 102 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1996), holding that an
employer was required to arbitrate employment disputes even though the employment
application did not specifically require arbitration of such disputes.
42. See Vera Korzun & Thomas H. Lee, An Empirical Survey of International
Commercial Arbitration Cases in the US District Court for the Southern District of New
York, 1970–2014, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 307, 340 (2015); see also Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
330 U.N.T.S. 38.
43. For a record and analysis of empirical data concerning international commercial
arbitrations in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, see Korzun &
Lee, supra note 42. The article describes the district court as “the John F. Kennedy (JFK)
Airport of the international commercial arbitration community” due to its status as the
busiest venue in the world for those types of arbitrations. Id. at 313. Between 1970 and
2014, there were 122 actions in the Southern District of New York involving suits to enforce
arbitral awards, 111 actions to enforce arbitration agreements, 46 actions to seek interim
measures, and 25 suits to set aside or vacate arbitral awards. Id. at 346–47.
44. See Why Arbitrate in New York, N.Y. INT’L ARB. CTR., http://nyiac.org/new-york/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/C6NG-5MC6].
45. See Korzun & Lee, supra note 42, at 340.
46. But see Committee on International Commercial Disputes of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, The “Manifest Disregard of Law” Doctrine and International
Arbitration in New York, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 209, 209 (2013) (discussing the
questionable desirability of New York as a seat for international arbitration for reasons
outside the scope of this Note).
47. See Why Arbitrate in New York, supra note 44.
48. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 22.1 (Larry E.
Edmonson ed., 3d ed. 2015).
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initiate a suit in court, ignoring the arbitration agreement altogether.49 In
that case, a defendant can request a stay pending arbitration, move to
compel arbitration, or both.50 A plaintiff may also initiate arbitration, and a
defendant may commence a court action to argue that the dispute is not
covered by the arbitration agreement.51 In addition, a party may ignore a
demand for arbitration, leading the other to sue to compel arbitration.52
A discussion of how arbitrable disputes can land in federal court warrants
a brief overview of the doctrine of separability. The Supreme Court
recognized the doctrine in the landmark decision Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,53 a case interpreting and applying the
FAA. As the Court articulated in Prima Paint, the doctrine of separability
dictates that an arbitration agreement is treated as a contractual agreement
that is independent from the main or underlying contract of which it is a
part.54 As a result, an arbitration agreement is not necessarily rendered
unenforceable by the invalidity of the underlying contract.55 In other
words, because arbitration agreements are separate from the contracts of
which they are a part, arbitrators retain their jurisdiction even if the validity
of the underlying contract is challenged. Consequently, when a party
moves to compel arbitration or stay litigation pending arbitration, courts
must refer arbitrable issues to arbitration even if the validity of the
underlying contract is challenged.56 The inverse of this doctrine—that the
invalidity of an arbitration agreement does not invalidate the underlying
contract—also holds true.57 The Court in Prima Paint further elaborated
that, in determining whether to stay litigation under § 3 or compel
arbitration under § 4, the only question appropriate for a court to consider is
that of the validity of the arbitration agreement itself.58
The separability doctrine distinguishes between challenges to the
arbitration agreement and those to the underlying contract as a whole.59
Challenges to the arbitration agreement itself are questions of arbitrability,
which, unless expressly reserved for the arbitrator, are appropriate for the
court to decide.60 On the other hand, challenges to the contract as a whole
are questions exclusively left to the arbitrator.61 As a result, a dispute that

49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
54. See id. at 402; see also Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in
International Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit?: Or Can Something Indeed Come from
Nothing?, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 21 (2002).
55. See Smit, supra note 54, at 21.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 412–16.
59. See 31 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 905.02,
LexisNexis (database updated 2015).
60. See id.; see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
61. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 59, § 905.02.
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is arguably subject to arbitration could begin in federal court, where the
court is charged with determining arbitrability at the outset.
One justification for the separability doctrine is based on the essential
autonomy of arbitration.62 Invoking the doctrine prevents parties from
delaying arbitration or avoiding it altogether by challenging the underlying
contract containing the arbitration clause either in court or in the arbitration
proceeding itself.63 Avoiding judicial interference in disputes over
arbitrable issues in this way helps to preserve the integrity and efficacy of
the arbitral process.64
Another justification for separability is that it protects against the danger
that arbitrators will improperly uphold their own jurisdiction over a matter
in private arbitrations.65 Because decisions about the validity of agreements
necessarily dictate the limits of arbitrators’ power, arbitrators have a strong
economic incentive to find that they have jurisdiction so that they can hear a
dispute.66 Therefore, the authority of courts to decide the threshold issue of
whether an arbitration agreement is valid is a necessary safeguard against
this potential for overreaching.67
In addition, this doctrine preserves one of the bedrock principles of
arbitration as articulated by the Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd—respecting the parties’ right to contract by enforcing their
agreements.68 It is a necessary tool “to effectuate the parties’ implied or
express intent that any and all disputes between them be arbitrated,
including disputes about the validity of their underlying contract.”69
E. The Effect of a Court’s Order to Stay or Dismiss:
Interlocutory Appeals and Why This Issue Matters
A federal district court’s decision to stay or dismiss an action determines
when an appeal is permitted. A stay is considered an interlocutory order
and is not appealable under § 16 of the FAA.70 While dismissal triggers
appellate jurisdiction, which allows an immediate appeal, granting a stay
precludes the possibility of an immediate appeal.71
In 1988, Congress amended the FAA to clarify the right of appeal, with
the intent to “promote appeals from orders barring arbitration and limit

62. See Smit, supra note 54, at 22.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Korzun & Lee, supra note 42, at 321.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); see also Smit,
supra note 54, at 22.
69. Smit, supra note 54, at 22.
70. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012).
71. See Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts As Gatekeepers?: A New Vision of
Appellate Jurisdiction Over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365, 1378
(2002); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 87 n.2 (2000).
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appeals from orders directing arbitration.”72 That amendment was later
codified as § 16 of the FAA.73 Section 16(b) prohibits appeals from an
interlocutory order granting a stay of an action pending arbitration under
§ 3.74
Contrast that with § 16(a), which provides that, if the court order is a
“final decision,” appellate review is permitted.75 Therefore, appellate
review is precluded unless the court order is considered a final decision or
falls within one of the exceptions in § 16(a)(1) or (2).76 Even the
distinction between a stay and a final decision is not clear, however. The
circuit courts are divided on when a decision is “final” within the meaning
of § 16(a)(3),77 but the Supreme Court has given some clarification.
In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,78 the Supreme
Court squarely addressed the question of whether an order compelling
arbitration and dismissing an action was a “final decision with respect to an
arbitration within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) of the [FAA], and thus is
immediately appealable pursuant to that Act.”79 Noting that the FAA does
not provide its own definition, the Court described a final decision as one
that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court
to do but execute the judgment.”80 Ultimately, it held that, when a court
dismisses all claims before it, nothing is left for the court to do but execute
the ruling, so that the decision is “final” within the meaning of § 16(a)(3)
and therefore immediately appealable.81
The Third Circuit has noted that a dismissal, as opposed to a stay, causes
undue delay, thereby depriving a party entitled to arbitration of “the right to
proceed with arbitration without the substantial delay arising from an
72. See Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1993)).
73. See id.
74. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b) (“[A]n appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory
order . . . (1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title; (2) directing
arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title; (3) compelling arbitration under section
206 of this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.”).
75. See id. § 16(a)(1)–(3) (“An appeal may be taken from . . . (1) an order . . . (A)
refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title, (B) denying a petition under
section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed, (C) denying an application under
section 206 of this title to compel arbitration, (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an
award or partial award, or (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award; (2) an
interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration
that is subject to this title; or (3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject
to this title.”).
76. Adair Bus Sales, 25 F.3d at 955.
77. See id. (comparing the circuits’ conflict over whether an order can only be final
within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) and therefore immediately appealable if the only issue
before the court is arbitrability, and stating that a stay pending arbitration under § 3 will
“virtually always be characterized as interlocutory, and not as a final decision within
§ 16(a)(3)”).
78. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
79. Id. at 82.
80. Id. at 86 (quoting Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867
(1994)).
81. See id. at 89.
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appeal.”82 In the same opinion, the court contrasted the effects of granting
a motion to stay litigation: “[I]t relieves the party entitled to arbitrate of the
burden of continuing to litigate the issue while the arbitration process is ongoing, and it entitles that party to proceed immediately to arbitration
without the delay that would be occasioned by an appeal of the District
Court’s order to arbitrate.”83 Under § 16 of the FAA, an interlocutory
appeal is available following a court order “refusing a stay of any action
under section 3 of [the Act].”84
F. The Supreme Court’s Cases Involving Arbitrable Claims
In the last several decades, the Supreme Court has been increasingly
deferential to the arbitral process.85 Though the FAA was intended to
overcome a neutral-to-negative view of arbitration, “a number of this
Court’s cases decided in the last several decades have pushed the pendulum
far beyond a neutral attitude and endorsed a policy that strongly favors
private arbitration.”86 This pro-arbitration trend demonstrates increased
faith in the arbitral process and should influence other courts’ attitudes.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:
MANDATE A STAY OR PERMIT DISMISSAL?
The divide over whether the FAA mandates a stay or grants a district
court discretion to dismiss an action pending arbitration has recently
deepened. The Second Circuit has now weighed in on this issue in an
exhaustive and detailed opinion and has held that a stay is required under
the FAA.87 In light of this case, this part discusses the three conclusions the
circuit courts have reached when addressing § 3—to mandate a stay, to
permit dismissal, or to remain expressly uncommitted.

82. Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 271 (3d Cir. 2004).
83. Id. at 270.
84. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also Forsythe Int’l S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915
F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that § 16 favors arbitration by “permitting
interlocutory appeals of orders favoring litigation over arbitration and precluding review of
interlocutory orders that favor arbitration”).
85. Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding that arbitration in the
context of disputes arising under the Securities Act of 1933 would inadequately protect the
buyers of securities), with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985) (stating that the strong federal policy favoring arbitration requires courts to
construe parties’ intentions generously on issues of arbitrability).
86. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131–32 (2001). To demonstrate
the Court’s pro-arbitration policy, the Court cited Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991), Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989), Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See Circuit City, 532
U.S. at 132 n.14.
87. See Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015).
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A. Section 3 Mandates a Stay
One of the practical benefits of issuing a stay is that it prevents a court
from having to reestablish subject matter jurisdiction at the enforcement
stage following an arbitration award.88 Five circuits—the Tenth, Eleventh,
Seventh, Third, and Second—have held that a stay is mandated and that a
district court lacks discretion to dismiss.
1. The Tenth Circuit
Upon review of a case involving a breach of a distributorship agreement
in which the district court issued an order compelling arbitration, the Tenth
Circuit clarified that the “closing” of the case was not effectively a
dismissal; rather, the “order clearly contemplates the possibility of
continued federal litigation.”89 The appellate court continued: “[A stay] is
the relief statutorily authorized . . . . Were the order construed to be a
dismissal, the appropriate course for this court would be to vacate the order
and remand for issuance of a stay.”90
In a later decision, the Tenth Circuit again articulated that rule. In Adair
Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp.,91 a case in which the defendant sought a
stay pending arbitration, the district court found that the dispute was
squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement.92 The court then
proceeded to dismiss the action.93 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that
the district court should have granted the motion to stay pending arbitration
instead of dismissing the action.94
Notably, the later opinion focused on the question of appealability. The
court identified that “[a] majority of the circuits have adopted the view that
an order can only be final within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) and therefore
immediately appealable if arbitrability is the sole issue before the district
court.”95 However, “if issues other than the propriety of arbitration are
raised or relief other than a determination as to the arbitrability of the
dispute is sought,” an order is not final and therefore not immediately
appealable.96 Adopting that majority approach, the court determined that a
stay under § 3 effectively always will be interlocutory and not final within
the meaning of § 16(a)(3).97 The Tenth Circuit reasoned in part that there is
an inherent likelihood in § 3 suits of the presence of issues other than
88. See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT § 9.2.3 (1995) (stating that issuing a stay under FAA § 3 following an
arbitration award allows parties seeking to confirm, vacate, or modify the award to return to
the federal court where the stayed action is pending).
89. Quinn v. CGR, 828 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987).
90. Id. at 1465 n.2 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982)).
91. 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994).
92. See id. at 954.
93. See id. at 954–55.
94. See id. at 955 (citing Quinn, 828 F.2d at 1465 n.2).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
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arbitrability.98 Ultimately, the court noted that, if the district court had
properly granted the defendant’s motion for a stay, that order would have
been interlocutory because the plaintiff sought arbitrability of the dispute,
and the court would not have had appellate jurisdiction.99 The court based
its appellate jurisdiction on the fact that the appeal was presented following
the district court’s order of dismissal.100
2. The Eleventh Circuit
In a case involving a sexual harassment claim by an employee against a
stock brokerage firm, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida
found that the pendent state law claims were covered by the arbitration
agreement and dismissed those claims.101 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed that the claims were subject to arbitration but held that the district
court should have stayed them instead of ordering dismissal.102 The court
explicitly held that “[u]pon finding that a claim is subject to an arbitration
agreement, the court should order that the action be stayed pending
arbitration.”103 Accordingly, it vacated the dismissal of the state law claims
and remanded the action with instructions that the claims be stayed pending
arbitration.104
Consistent with the Tenth Circuit,105 the Eleventh Circuit also noted the
appealability issue.106 The court observed that dismissal was appealable as
a final decision; however, if the district court had stayed the state law
claims, the order would not have been appealable pursuant to 9 U.S.C.
§ 16(b)(1)–(2).107
3. The Seventh Circuit
In a case involving claims of age discrimination brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction because the
claims were pending arbitration.108 However, on appeal, the Seventh
Circuit held that, whenever a suit must be interrupted to refer to another
forum, the district court should retain jurisdiction by staying the claims
rather than dismissing the action.109 Underlying the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning is an efficiency argument—if there may later be grounds for
reinstating jurisdiction, the suit can easily and efficiently resume in court if
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992).
102. See id.
103. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1992)).
104. See id.
105. See Adair Bus Sales, 25 F.3d at 955.
106. See Bender, 971 F.2d at 699.
107. See id.
108. See Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 95 C 6890, 2001 WL 1002466, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 30, 2001).
109. See Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 288 F.3d 313, 318 (7th Cir. 2002).
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the action were stayed rather than dismissed.110 In constructing this
reasoning, the court analogized the issue to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.111
The court had previously addressed this doctrine in an earlier case:
[I]n its central and original form, in which it is more illuminatingly
described, however, as “exclusive agency jurisdiction,” . . . applies only
when, in a suit involving a regulated firm but not brought under the
regulatory statute itself, an issue arises that is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the regulatory agency to resolve, although the agency’s
resolution of it will usually be subject to judicial review. When such an
issue arises, the suit must stop and the issue must be referred to the
agency for resolution. If the agency’s resolution of the issue does not
dispose of the entire case, the case can resume subject to judicial review
of that resolution along whatever path governs review of the agency’s
decisions, whether back to the court in which the original case is pending
or, if the statue governing review of the agency’s decisions designates
another court, to that court.112

In Tice v. American Airlines, Inc.,113 the court applied this reasoning to
the question of whether to stay or dismiss cases pending arbitration and
concluded that that context should be treated similarly.114 Accordingly, it
modified the judgment of the district court to convert the dismissal to a stay
pending arbitration.115
A few years later, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its position that the
proper course of action is to stay the proceedings pending arbitration rather
than dismiss altogether.116 Furthermore, the court clarified the proper
source of a district court’s authority in that context, stating that it does not
derive from Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but rather
directly from the FAA itself in § 3.117
4. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit reviewed a decision by the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, which denied a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration and
instead dismissed them with prejudice.118 In that case, the appellate court
determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the district
court’s order constituted a “final decision with respect to an arbitration”

110. See id.
111. See id. at 317–18.
112. Id. (quoting Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted)).
113. 288 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 2002).
114. See id. at 318.
115. See id. at 318–19.
116. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins., 417 F.3d 727, 732 n.7 (7th Cir. 2005).
117. See id. (citing Tice, 288 F.3d at 318); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1360, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2015)
(characterizing a motion to stay pending arbitration as “Not Enumerated in Rule 12(b)”).
118. See Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Lloyd v. Hovensa
LLC, 243 F. Supp. 2d 346 (V.I. 2003).
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pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).119 Upon consideration of whether the
district court erred in dismissing the action rather than granting the motion
for stay, the appellate court noted that this was an issue of first impression
and recognized the discord among the circuits.120 The Third Circuit
emphasized in detail its reliance on a Supreme Court decision—Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph—in forming its own interpretation
of the statute.121
In Green Tree Financial, the Court held that the plain meaning of the
term “final decision” must be applied to § 16(c)(3).122 Applying that plain
language reading to § 3, the Third Circuit held that a stay was mandated123:
The directive that the Court “shall” enter a stay simply cannot be read to
say that the Court shall enter a stay in all cases except those in which all
claims are arbitrable and the Court finds dismissal to be the preferable
approach. On the contrary, the statute clearly states, without exception,
that whenever suit is brought on an arbitrable claim, the Court “shall”
upon application stay the litigation until arbitration has been
concluded . . . . Accordingly, we hold that the District Court was
obligated under 9 U.S.C. § 3 to grant the stay once it decided to order
arbitration.124

In support of its plain language approach to interpretation, the Third
Circuit emphasized the maxim that only in the face of an absurd result that
could not have been intended by Congress would a court be at liberty to
“disregard an unambiguous directive.”125 In addition, the court noted that it
is burdensome for a litigant to have to file a new action each time the
court’s assistance is required and bear the risk that the case would be
assigned to a new judge.126 In comparison, the court articulated the benefits
of allowing the court to retain jurisdiction by issuing a stay, thereby
expediting the process and allowing the parties to return easily to the same
judge.127
Further, the Third Circuit identified additional practical benefits to
mandating a stay. Issuing a stay relieves the parties of having to continue to
litigate while the arbitration is ongoing and allows the parties to proceed
immediately with arbitration without having to wait for an appeal of the
district court’s order to arbitrate.128 Therefore, the court reasoned that the
119. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 268 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 86 (2000)).
120. See id. at 268–69 (citing the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
addressing this issue).
121. Id. at 269–70.
122. Green Tree Financial, 531 U.S. at 88.
123. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269–71.
124. Id. at 269.
125. Id. at 269–70 (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535 (3d Cir. 2003)).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id. An appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order granting a stay under § 3
or compelling arbitration under § 4. 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)–(2) (2012). However, an immediate
appeal is available if the court issued an order refusing to grant a stay or denying a petition to
compel arbitration. Id. § 16(a)(1)(A)–(B).
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overall statutory scheme of the FAA shows a policy decision to eliminate
judicial interference with the arbitral process unless and until there is a final
award.129 Accordingly, interpreting the statute according to its plain
meaning was the only reading consistent with the text, the overall structure
of the statute, and the strong policy favoring arbitration.130
5. The Second Circuit
Most recently, the Second Circuit joined the circuits holding that a stay is
required.131 The case, a class action brought by consumers against a
wireless phone service provider seeking a declaratory judgment that
compelling arbitration under the FAA pursuant to a contractual arbitration
clause was unconstitutional, was on appeal from the District Court for the
Southern District of New York.132 The district court denied declaratory
relief and compelled arbitration of all claims.133 In addition, it denied the
defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings, instead dismissing the action
and noting that whether dismissal was permitted was still an open question
within the circuit.134
Acknowledging the divide among the circuit courts, the Second Circuit
also noted that the Supreme Court had not yet decided the issue135 and that
the Second Circuit itself had suggested competing conclusions. For
example, in McMahan Securities Co. v. Forum Capital Markets, L.P.,136
the court stated that “[u]nder the [FAA], a district court must stay
proceedings if satisfied that the parties have agreed in writing to arbitrate an
issue or issues underlying the district court proceeding. The FAA leaves no
discretion with the district court in the matter.”137 Contrary to this position,
however, the court also stated in a subsequent case that “if the court
concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable, it
must then decide whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending

129. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 270.
130. Id. at 271.
131. See Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015).
132. See id. at 343; see also Katz v. Cellco P’ship, No. 12 CV 9193(VB), 2013 WL
6621022 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013). On appeal, the Second Circuit also analyzed state law
claims that are not of importance to this Note. See Katz, 794 F.3d at 343–44. Additionally,
the plaintiff brought challenges to the constitutionality of the FAA, arguing that compelling
arbitration violates Article III’s separation of powers principles and deprives a plaintiff of his
personal right to adjudication before an independent Article III judge. Katz, 2013 WL
66221022, at *4. The district court discussed and dismissed those challenges. Id. at *8–15.
On appeal, the Second Circuit called the challenges “meritless” and deferred to the “wellreasoned opinion of the District Court” on that issue. Katz, 794 F.3d at 343.
133. See Katz, 2013 WL 6621022, at *15.
134. See Katz, 794 F.3d at 344.
135. See id. (“The question whether the District Court should have taken that course [that
is, to dismiss rather than to stay the case after all claims were compelled to arbitration] is not
before us, and we do not address it.” (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 87 n.2 (2000))).
136. 35 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1994).
137. Id. at 85–86 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1992); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 218 (1985)).
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arbitration.”138 But in neither of those cases did the court address the
specific question posed in Katz; rather, both cases addressed whether a stay
was necessary or ancillary to the arbitrability issue.139
In another relevant case, the court “urge[d] district courts in these
circumstances to be as clear as possible about whether they truly intend to
dismiss an action or mean to grant a stay pursuant to [FAA § 3], which
supplies that power.”140 The facts of that case are, however, also
distinguishable. There, the court addressed whether dismissal under § 16 of
the FAA was a “final decision,” assuming for the purposes of the decision
that dismissal was permissible.141
Following these decisions, in Katz, the Second Circuit then held that a
stay is required pending arbitration.142 In support of this holding, the court
analyzed the text, structure, and underlying policy of the FAA.143 First
looking to the text of the statute, the court focused on the word “shall,”
concluding that it stripped the directive of any discretionary nature.144 The
court also stated that the plain language must be followed unless it produces
an absurd result, which it found was not the case there.145 In fact, the court
held that, contrary to an absurd result, a mandatory stay compels a result
firmly congruent with the FAA’s overall statutory scheme and underlying
policy.146
Next, considering the FAA’s statutory scheme as a whole, the Second
Circuit emphasized the appellate implications.147 If a court has discretion
to dismiss an arbitrable matter, the court “effectively converts an otherwiseunappealable interlocutory stay order into an appealable final dismissal
order.”148 As a result, rather than allocating appellate rights to Congress as
the statute expressly intends, courts would have granted themselves the
power to create such rights.149 The court ruled that this is explicitly
contrary to the statute, which denies immediate appeals from interlocutory
orders to compel arbitration or stay proceedings.150
The court found that, in addition to being discordant with the statutory
structure, the disruption in appellate procedure is also incongruent with the
pro-arbitration policy underlying the statute.151 The Supreme Court has
articulated that the FAA’s policy is “to move the parties to an arbitrable
dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1998).
See id. at 76–77; McMahan Sec. Co., 35 F.3d at 85–86.
Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 278 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 2002).
See id. at 92–93.
Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 345–47 (2015).
See id.
See id. at 345.
See id. at 345–46.
See id. at 346.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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possible.”152 In fact, the statute itself provides that judicial participation in
the arbitral process is only permitted in certain capacities, including, inter
alia, to designate or appoint an arbitrator or fill an arbitrator vacancy,153
subpoena witnesses or punish witnesses for contempt,154 and modify or
correct an arbitral award made in error.155 The Second Circuit relied in part
on this reasoning when it emphasized that a stay furthers the policy of
limited judicial participation by enabling parties to proceed directly to
arbitration without the burden of additional litigation and without judicial
interference until the final award.156
The Second Circuit was unpersuaded by the argument favored by other
circuit courts that efficient docket management is a reason to permit
dismissal of an action pending arbitration.157 It found that such efficiency,
while within the inherent authority of district courts, is not a sufficient basis
to trump a statutory mandate such as that in § 3 of the FAA.158 In support
of this conclusion, the court cited several cases from other circuits that held
that there are certain statutory constraints on a district court’s inherent
power to manage its docket efficiently.159
In conclusion, the court, affirming the district court’s ruling compelling
arbitration but reversing the dismissal of the action, held that the
justification for permitting dismissal was outweighed by support from the
text, structure, and underlying policy of the statute that a stay is mandated
upon request by one of the parties once all of the claims in an action have
been referred to arbitration.160 Under the Second Circuit’s holding, a party
resisting a motion to stay under § 3 of the FAA no longer will be able to
appeal an adverse ruling until the arbitration proceedings are complete.161
152. See id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
22 (1983)).
153. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
154. Id. § 7.
155. Id. § 11.
156. See Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 346 (2d Cir. 2015). Notably, the court
explicitly addressed only actions in which all claims are pending arbitration and not those in
which fewer than all of the claims have been referred to arbitration. Id. at 345 n.6.
157. Id. at 346–47.
158. See id. at 346.
159. See id. at 346–47 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962))
(holding that efficient docket management is within the inherent authority of district courts);
Marion S. Mishkin Law Office v. Lopalo, 767 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2014); Perez v. Wis.
Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[J]udges must place enforcement of the
[Prison Litigation Reform Act’s administrative-exhaustion requirement] over a concern for
efficient docket management . . . .”); In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A court
has the inherent power to manage its docket, subject of course to statutes requiring special
treatment for specified types of cases . . . .”); Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st
Cir. 1992) (“It is beyond cavil that, absent a statute or rule to the contrary, federal district
courts possess the inherent power to stay pending litigation when the efficacious
management of court dockets reasonably requires such intervention . . . .”).
160. Katz, 794 F.3d at 347.
161. See Jeffrey M. Prokop & Jamie Shookman, Second Circuit Clarifies that a District
Court Must Stay, and May Not Dismiss, Arbitrable Claims Pending Arbitration, ORRICK
(Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Pages/Second-CircuitClarifies-That-A-District-Court-Must-Stay-And-May-Not-Dismiss-Arbitrable-ClaimsPending-Arbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/4C5X-RBF5].
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B. Section 3 Permits Dismissals
The benefit of permitting a district court to dismiss an action altogether,
as long as all the issues are subject to arbitration, is efficient docket
management. This is an increasingly important consideration in an alreadyburdened court system.162 However, it is worth noting an undesirable
consequence of such discretionary docket management: when a district
court exercises its discretion to manage its docket by dismissing a case, the
case-management responsibility then shifts to the appellate court which
encompasses the district court.163
The Ninth, Fifth, and First Circuits have held that a district court has
discretion to dismiss cases under these circumstances. Even among the
district courts in those circuits, there is disagreement regarding the authority
under which the court may dismiss the action. Some circuits have
dismissed an action where all the claims were found to be subject to
arbitration under Rule 12(b)(1); others have done so under Rules 12(b)(3)
or 12(b)(6).164
1. The Ninth Circuit
In Sparling v. Hoffman Construction Co.,165 a subcontractor and its
shareholders alleged fraudulent inducement and other claims against the
general contractor.166 The trial judge dismissed the complaint sua
sponte,167 which led to the issue on appeal of whether such dismissal of the
arbitrable claims was proper.168 The plaintiff argued that the district court
lacked discretion to dismiss the action under § 3 per the arbitration
clause.169 In its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied upon an earlier case in
which it affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment.170 In
Sparling, the court held that a court has authority under § 3 of the FAA to
grant a stay pending arbitration “but [that authority] does not preclude

162. See, e.g., Reynolds v. De Silva, No. 09 Civ. 9218(CM), 2010 WL 743510, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010) (“It would be an inefficient use of the Court’s docket to stay the
action.”).
163. See KIMM LAW FIRM, Second Circuit Joins the Circuit-Split, Holding an Arbitration
Clause Requires Courts to Stay, Not Dismiss, Actions, KIMM NOTES, COMMENT. & ANALYSIS
ON LEGAL DEV. (July 28, 2015), http://www.kimmlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Kimm-Notes-2015-7-28-Arbitration-Stay.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5U3-R7VC].
164. See, e.g., Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053,
1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing on 12(b)(6) grounds); Atkins v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 819 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 1987) (dismissing on 12(b)(1) grounds); Cedars-Sinai
Med. Ctr. v. Glob. Excel Mgmt., Inc., No. CV 09-3627 PSG (AJWx), 2010 WL 5572079, at
*9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (dismissing on 12(b)(3) grounds).
165. 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
166. See id. at 636.
167. See id. at 637.
168. See id. at 638.
169. See id.
170. See Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 586 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1978).
However, in that case, the defendant did not request a stay of the proceedings. Id. at 146.
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summary judgment when all claims are barred by an arbitration clause.”171
The Ninth Circuit determined that “the [statutory] provision did not limit
the court’s authority to grant a dismissal in this case.”172 Further, it held
that, because the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass all of
the plaintiff’s claims, thereby requiring all claims to be referred to
arbitration, the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing the
claims.173
2. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit likewise interpreted § 3 to permit dismissal in Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,174 distinguishing cases in which a party
commences suit upon any issue referable to arbitration from those in which
all of the issues raised must be submitted to arbitration.175
In Alford, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied a
motion to compel arbitration,176 and the defendant appealed. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the decision to refuse the defendant’s demand to
arbitrate,177 and the defendant again appealed to the Supreme Court, which
vacated and remanded that decision.178 On remand, the district court
dismissed the case with prejudice and ordered the parties to arbitration
within thirty days,179 and the plaintiff appealed the order.180 Before the
Fifth Circuit decided the case again, one of the issues presented was
whether the lower court erred in dismissing rather than staying the case
given that all the issues were required to be submitted to arbitration.181
In response to the plaintiff’s argument that the district court erred
according to § 3 of the FAA, the Fifth Circuit agreed that “a stay is
mandatory upon a showing that the opposing party has commenced suit
‘upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration.’”182 However, the court distinguished that situation,
stating that the rule was not intended to preclude dismissal in “the proper
circumstances.”183 The court explained that, as long as all the issues raised

171. Sparling, 864 F.2d at 638 (discussing the holding of Martin Marietta Aluminum,
Inc.).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992).
175. See id. at 1164 (analyzing a discrimination action brought by a former employee of a
brokerage firm against the broker).
176. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
177. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 107–08 (5th Cir. 1990).
178. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Alford, 500 U.S. 930, 930 (1991).
179. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
180. See Alford, 975 F.2d at 1163.
181. See id. at 1162–63.
182. Id. at 1164 (quoting Campeau Corp. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 723 F. Supp. 224,
226–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
183. Id.
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are subject to arbitration, dismissal is not precluded.184 It did so citing
district court cases and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sparling.185
Further, the court noted the practical implications of granting a stay.186 It
found that the proper course of action in a case where all claims are subject
to arbitration is not to stay the action because that would serve no purpose:
“Any post-arbitration remedies sought by the parties will not entail renewed
consideration and adjudication of the merits of the controversy but would
be circumscribed to a judicial review of the arbitrator’s award in the limited
manner prescribed by law.”187
3. The First Circuit
In Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc.,188 a suspended student alleged
claims against his private school under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and local law.189 The District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico denied the school’s request for arbitration and issued
a preliminary injunction requiring the school to reenroll the student,190
which the school appealed.191
The First Circuit devoted a relatively large portion of its opinion to
arbitration, explaining the strong federal policy favoring arbitration under
the FAA and the arbitrability of the ADA claims.192 The court specifically
addressed the question of whether a district court must stay the claims
subject to arbitration or has discretion to dismiss.193 The court concluded
that “the district court shall consider whether the case should be dismissed
or stayed.”194 In an important footnote, the court squarely found that “a
court may dismiss, rather than stay, a case when all of the issues before the
court are arbitrable.”195 In support, the court cited cases from the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits and from the District Court of Puerto Rico.196
In Bercovitch, because jurisdiction was based on a federal question and
the two federal claims in that case were arbitrable, the only remaining state
law claim was before the court solely based on pendent jurisdiction.197

184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Id. (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sea-Land of P.R., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 750, 757
(D.P.R. 1986)).
188. 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998).
189. See id. at 143.
190. See Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., 964 F. Supp. 597, 605–07 (D.P.R. 1997).
191. See Bercovitch, 133 F.3d at 147.
192. See id. at 147–51.
193. See id. at 156.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 156 n.21.
196. See id. (citing Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.
1992); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 637–38 (9th Cir. 1988); Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. Sea-Land of P.R., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 750, 757 (D.P.R. 1986)).
197. See id.
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Therefore, the First Circuit held that the district court acted within its
discretion in dismissing the action altogether.198
C. The Fourth Circuit Explicitly Remains Uncommitted
Disagreement on this issue exists not only among, but within, the circuit
courts. The Fourth Circuit provides an illustration of that tension.
Although the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue of whether to
stay or dismiss an action when all the claims are subject to arbitration, it has
not remained silent.199
In Aggarao v. MOL Ship Management Co.,200 a seaman sued his
employer, a ship owner, and others for damages arising from severe injuries
he suffered while on a vessel near Baltimore.201 He alleged claims of
“unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, breach of contract, violation of
the Seaman’s Wage Act, and negligence under general maritime law and
the Jones Act.”202 The District Court for the District of Maryland
dismissed the complaint for improper venue after it determined that,
pursuant to the contract, all the claims were subject to arbitration in the
Philippines.203
In reviewing the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice, the Fourth Circuit noted tension between two of its own prior
holdings.204 In Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,205 the court stated that
“[w]hen a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and covers
the matter in dispute, the FAA commands the federal courts to stay any
ongoing judicial proceedings and to compel arbitration.”206 In Choice
Hotels International, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc.,207 however, the
same court had previously recognized that “dismissal is a proper remedy
when all of the issues presented in a lawsuit are arbitrable.”208 Hooters of
America did not expressly overrule Choice Hotels International—notably,
the latter case was distinguishable because all of the issues presented were
arbitrable.209 In Aggarao, on the other hand, one claim was not subject to
arbitration.210
After recognizing the tension between those two prior holdings, as well
as the unsettled disagreement among the circuit courts on whether a court

198. See id.
199. See id.
200. 675 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2012).
201. See id. at 360.
202. See id.
203. See Aggarao v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 2d 733, 743 (D. Md. 2010).
204. See Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 375–76.
205. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 937 (citation omitted).
207. 252 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2001).
208. Id. at 709–10.
209. See id.
210. See Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 376 n.18 (4th Cir. 2012)
(noting that, even under Choice Hotels International, dismissal is not proper when the issues
are not all subject to arbitration).
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must stay or has discretion to dismiss an action subject to arbitration,211 the
court also noted explicitly that it need not resolve the issue because it was
not squarely presented.212 In so doing, the Fourth Circuit is the only circuit
that has remained expressly uncommitted on this issue.
III. NO IFS, ANDS, OR BUTS: A DISTRICT COURT IS REQUIRED
TO GRANT A STAY UNDER § 3
Part III of this Note argues that the correct interpretation of § 3 is that a
district court must stay an action while issues are pending arbitration; it
lacks discretion to dismiss. This argument is supported by a plain language
reading of the provision and a myriad of sound policy concerns. This part
also adopts the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Katz as a compelling and
persuasive justification and framework for this interpretation of § 3.
A. A Textual Reading of § 3 Requires a Stay
It is undeniable that, on its face, the text of § 3 requires a stay upon
request by one of the parties. The provision uses the obligatory language
“must stay”—a clear mandate that “leaves no discretion with the district
court in the matter.”213 Conspicuously, the statute does not explicitly allow
any discretionary ability on the part of courts to act contrary to that
instruction. Any potential authority of a district court to dismiss is purely
based on concerns and reasoning outside the scope of the provision itself.
However, as the Second Circuit clearly stated, “[C]ourts may disregard a
statute’s plain meaning [only] where it begets absurdity.”214 Section 3 is an
unambiguous directive, and reading it to require a stay certainly does not
beget absurdity.
The courts that have held that dismissal is permissible even when all
issues are subject to arbitration215 misinterpret the language of the statute.
The statute clearly anticipates circumstances in which “any issue [is]
referable to arbitration.”216 The word “any” does not logically exclude
circumstances in which more than one, or even all, of the issues are
referable to arbitration. It merely contemplates disputes in which at least
one issue is subject to arbitration. Interpreting the statute to exempt such
circumstances is plainly contrary to the precise language of the statute.

211. See id. (comparing Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins., 417 F.3d 727, 732 n.7 (7th Cir.
2005), with Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992)).
212. See id.
213. McMahan Sec. Co. v. Forum Capital Mkts., 35 F.3d 82, 85–86 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1992); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)).
214. Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 345–46 (2d Cir. 2015).
215. See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998); Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr.
Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
216. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (emphasis added).
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B. Policy Concerns Support Requiring a Stay
There are many policy arguments supporting a mandated stay. First,
mandating a stay is the more pro-arbitration position. Second, mandating a
stay eliminates the possibility of interlocutory appeals, which ultimately
stall the arbitration proceeding and undermine the autonomy of the arbitral
process as a whole. Third, a mandated stay is preferable because docket
management is an unpersuasive justification for dismissal. Finally, in the
interests of judicial economy and efficiency, mandating a stay avoids the
jurisprudential chaos that currently surrounds dismissals.
1. Requiring a Stay Is More Consistent
with Pro-Arbitration Policy
Although at first glance it may seem counterintuitive for a court to retain
its jurisdiction over a matter and the parties as a means of promoting wellestablished pro-arbitration policy, doing so ultimately advances that goal.
Granting a stay and retaining jurisdiction allows quick and efficient
resolution following the issuance of the arbitrator’s final award should any
issues remain.
This benefit is well-illustrated by a case from the Seventh Circuit. In IDS
Life Insurance v. Royal Alliance Associates, Inc.,217 the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court’s refusal to sanction the defendant, who prevailed
in arbitration.218 The plaintiff originally sued in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois.219 Upon the defendant’s motion, the court
stayed the suit and compelled arbitration,220 where the defendant ultimately
prevailed.221 Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner noted
that the defendant then “scampered off to a New York state court and asked
it to confirm the arbitrator’s award.”222 The court’s frustration was based
on the notion that issuing a stay effectively holds the case open for efficient
post-arbitration proceedings. The defendant in that case failed to appreciate
that benefit.
That Seventh Circuit case demonstrates the importance of a continued
oversight role for federal courts in post-arbitration proceedings and the
benefits to all parties of obtaining a stay. From a policy perspective, a
mandated stay furthers one of the purposes of the FAA—encouraging
efficient and speedy dispute resolution.223

217. 266 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2001).
218. Id. at 654.
219. See IDS Life Ins. v. SunAmerica, Inc., Nos. 95 C 1204, 95 C 1212, 97 C 7857, 2000
WL 283939 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2000).
220. See id. at *1.
221. See id. at *3.
222. IDS Life Ins., 266 F.3d at 653. Judge Posner went on to state, “The choice of forum
was curious, since it was the federal district court in Chicago that at the defendants’ urging
had stayed the suit filed by the plaintiffs so that the matter could be referred to arbitration.
But stranger than the choice of forum was the reason given for the choice, that the district
court in Chicago did not have jurisdiction to confirm the award—which is ridiculous.” Id.
223. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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2. Requiring a Stay Avoids the Possibility of Interlocutory Appeals
A dismissal is characterized as a “final order” under the FAA.224
Therefore, along with orders refusing to compel arbitration, denial of a
request to stay is immediately appealable and subject to interlocutory
review.225 Section 16 as a whole creates a right of interlocutory appeal for
any order that is unfavorable to arbitration, whether by dismissal (that is, a
final order), a denial of a motion to compel arbitration under § 4, or a
refusal to stay an action pending arbitration.226 While on such a procedural
appeal, the resolution of the merits is necessarily stalled, possibly for an
extended period of time, which is contrary to the purposes of arbitration—
speed and efficiency in dispute resolution. In contrast, when a stay is
granted, an immediate appeal is unavailable.227 In Katz, the Second Circuit
appropriately recognized that allowing dismissal gives judges discretion
that “would empower them to confer appellate rights expressly proscribed
by Congress.”228
The proper role of the court in the context of arbitrable matters is
enumerated in the FAA.229 Sections 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11 contemplate
specific circumstances under which a court is permitted to insert itself into
the arbitral process.230 In enumerating those circumstances, it is clear that
one of the intentions of the Act is to avoid excessive judicial interference by
excluding all other bases for such interference under the doctrine of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.231 Limiting instances of permissible
judicial interference to those enumerated in the statute supports the proarbitration policy of the statute by keeping the judiciary out of the arbitral
process to a great extent. This is unsurprising when one considers that such
interference inhibits the arbitral process generally by creating barriers to
efficient resolution of the merits both in court and through arbitration. This
is inherently anti-arbitration—or, at the very least, it is anti-arbitral
autonomy. Instead, requiring courts to grant a stay eliminates the concern
that the parties will be subject to additional litigation before the arbitral
resolution.

224. See supra Part I.E.
225. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009) (stating that a party
may, at any time, appeal an order refusing to stay an action, even if the claim to stay is
unmeritorious or frivolous); see also 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
227. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
228. Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 346 (2d Cir. 2015).
229. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
231. See Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (“A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative. For example, the rule that ‘each citizen is
entitled to vote’ implies that noncitizens are not entitled to vote.”).
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3. Docket Management Is an Unpersuasive
Justification for Permitting Dismissals
The Second Circuit in Katz stated that district courts’ inherent authority
to manage their dockets cannot override a clear statutory directive.232 Even
where docket congestion is recognized as an appropriate consideration, such
as on a § 1404 motion to transfer venue, it is not a dispositive factor.233 In
such cases, docket management alone is insufficient to satisfy the interestsof-justice standard.234 If the location of litigation cannot be determined in
this way, certainly docket management cannot be a persuasive justification
in the context of a federal court’s decision on whether to stay an action
pending arbitration. The stakes in those circumstances are undeniably high,
as the decision dictates not merely where litigation will take place, but
whether it will take place at all. In this context, docket management must
not justify a court’s dismissal of an action contrary to the plain meaning of
an unambiguous statute.
4. Requiring a Stay Avoids the Chaos
Currently Surrounding Dismissals
Beyond the principle that docket management should be a relatively
small factor in determining whether to dismiss a case in federal court is the
fact that uncertainty as to the source of the power to dismiss can create
chaos that threatens the statutory scheme and the policy it serves. This
approach is antithetical to its stated justification: promoting judicial
economy via effective docket management.235 Given this confusion, the
economy argument does not stand.
Furthermore, although dismissal is often justified as a tool to effectuate
judicial economy, a mandated stay better accomplishes this goal. A major
flaw in the “permit dismissal” approach is that there is no clear standard or
agreement as to the bases for when dismissal is appropriate. Some courts
base dismissal on a 12(b)(1) approach, while others rely on 12(b)(3) or
12(b)(6).236 The inconsistencies in the sources of authority and bases for
dismissal create chaos far more disruptive than the evil of an overburdened
docket that dismissal purports to redress. The basis for each dismissal is
important because it has consequences in terms of the litigation process.

232. See Katz, 794 F.3d at 346–47 (citing cases).
233. See, e.g., In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 484 F.3d 951,
958–59 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he forum non conveniens doctrine should not be used as a
solution to court congestion . . . .”); P&S Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc. 331 F.3d
804, 808 (11th Cir. 2003); JTH Tax, Inc. v. Lee, 482 F. Supp. 2d 731, 739 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(“[A]lthough somewhat relevant, docket conditions generally receive minor consideration
and, as this court has held, cannot be the primary reason for retaining venue.”); see also
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 3854.
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
235. See, e.g., Reynolds v. De Silva, No. 09 Civ. 9218(CM), 2010 WL 743510, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010) (“It would be an inefficient use of the Court’s docket to stay the
action.”).
236. Compare supra note 164, with supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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For example, a 12(b)(1) motion may be made at any time.237 By contrast, a
12(b)(3) motion may only be made at the start of litigation.238 Meanwhile,
a 12(b)(6) motion is a more flexible remedy.239 Effectively, parties and the
course of the litigation are affected by an essentially arbitrary decision to
use one Rule as authority for dismissal over another. Worse still, a
litigant’s tactical decision in selecting one of these procedures to seek
dismissal could control how the other parties and the court itself would be
required to respond, which the statute never contemplated. Although the
stated benefits of dismissal are judicial economy and efficiency in docket
management, its practical effects undermine those benefits.
Mandating a stay removes this confusion.
From a practical,
jurisprudential perspective, and in the interests of judicial economy and
efficiency, courts should be required to grant a request to stay and should
not be found to have the discretion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Whether a district court is required to grant a stay or may, in its
discretion, order a dismissal is a significant issue that has real, tangible
consequences for the parties to a dispute and for the autonomy of the
arbitral process.240 The split among the circuit courts continues to deepen
as the issue remains unresolved.241 The Second Circuit, as a leader in
setting arbitration law and policy,242 stood staunchly on the side of a
mandated stay in its recent decision in Katz,243 warranting another look at
the issue and providing a persuasive framework ripe for consideration and
adoption by the Supreme Court of the United States.244 For the above
reasons, the Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning and hold
that, under § 3, courts may not use their discretion to dismiss an action
pending arbitration but must grant a stay.

237. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117, § 1350 (“[I]t has long been well-established that
the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time by any interested
party, either in the answer or in the form of a suggestion to the court prior to final judgment.”
(citing the policy of Rule 12(h)(3), which is to preserve the defense throughout the action,
and cases including, for example, Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004), and McNutt v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 186 (1936))).
238. See id. § 1352 (“Federal Rule 12(b)(3) requires the defense of improper venue to be
raised either by a pre-answer motion to dismiss, or in a responsive pleading.” (citing cases)).
239. See id. § 1357 (stating that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion of failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted must be made before service of a responsive pleading but Rule
12(h)(2) preserves the defense such that it may be raised as late as trial, noting that a judge
may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) even if no party makes a formal motion, and citing
cases).
240. See supra Part I.E.
241. See supra Part II.
242. See supra Part I.C.
243. See supra Part II.A.5.
244. On December 7, 2015, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari by the
parties in Katz. Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 136 S. Ct. 596 (2015) (mem.).

